Brannstrom’s Fortaleza Guide (requires GoogleEarth to load KMZ file)

Most conference participants for CLAG Fortaleza 26-30 May 2015 will want to use hotels in the Iracema and Meireles districts, which are near the northern Atlantic beachfront. I have indicated several places in this Guide that CLAG members might be interested in visiting, but this Guide is not intended to substitute for a city tour to be led by UFC geographers. (Beaches on the eastern Atlantic coast, Praia do Futuro, are also beautiful but have fewer hotels and are more distant from the conference site—see the Crocobeach placemark.) This brief guide omits several important aspects of Fortaleza’s geography, such as phenomena studied by Jeff Garmany (“Slums, space and spirituality: Religious diversity in contemporary Brazil,” Area 45: 47-55, and other papers).

Fortaleza’s international airport

Your flight to Fortaleza will arrive here, Pinto Martins International Airport site of Cocorote field, used by the U.S. military during World War II. Taxis to Iracema or Meireles cost around R$45.

Some quick linguistic advice: never use the term “busseta” to describe a small bus (it is a “van”) and try not to describe a jacket as a “saco.”

For an English speaking taxi driver, try Paulo Ricardo at 85 9618 2858 or 85 8576 0751. His typical greeting is “God bless America.

Conference location: UFC Geography Department

The Geography Department of the Universidade Federal do Ceará (http://www.ufc.br/) just celebrated the 10th anniversary of its graduate program (http://www.posgeografia.ufc.br/and https://www.facebook.com/POSGEOUFC).


The Department has several research groups with vibrant social media presence: Laboratório de Geoprocessamento http://www.labocart.ufc.br/ Fanpage https://www.facebook.com/LABOCART_UFC Blog http://labocartufc.blogspot.com.br/Twitter

Labocartufc Laboratório de Geoecologia da Paisagem e Planejamento Ambiental Blog http://lageplanufc.blogspot.com.br/
The Pici district of Fortaleza was the site of a U.S. military presence during World War II. Pici was one of several airstrips in northeastern Brazil that U.S. bombers and transport planes used to fly to Ascencion, Accra, and Dakar. In 1941, the U.S. military located 1155th Army Air Force Base AAFBU Unit-Fortaleza, part of the South Atlantic Division of the Air Transport Command. The site of the airstrip of the Pici Base is located just outside the UFC campus, on the present day Avenida Caneiro de Mendonça. Construction on Pici field started in 1941 and ended in March 1942. The airstrip was linked to the 2ª Base Americana em Fortaleza, the Cocorote Base, site of present-day Aeroporto Pinto Martins. (Source: OLIVEIRA, Augusto; LAVÔR, Ivonildo. A história da aviação no Ceará [Fortaleza: Expressão Gráfica, 2009], attached).

These links provide more information:

The Centro Cultural Dragão do Mar, a complex of museums, performance areas, restaurants, and shops, was the focus of the state’s recent urban redevelopment efforts. Linda Maria de Pontes Gondim’s book, O Dragão do Mar e a Fortaleza pós-moderna: cultura, patrimônio e imagem da cidade (Annablume, 2006) details how this site was part of the state’s goal of producing the city as a tourism destination, with special attention to the visitors to the Dragão do Mar in terms of demographic characteristics and experiences.
Teatro José de Alencar

The Teatro José de Alencar, inaugurated in June 1910, is named after Fortaleza’s most renowned writer, perhaps best known for his Iracema (available by Oxford University Press in their Library of Latin America series). Construction began in 1896, and a major project in 1989-1990 restored the building. In front of the Teatro is a public square with a statue representing Iracema (the cuckold is on the back of the statue). Nearby are the Museu das Secas and Museu do Ceará.

Beco da Poeira

Fortaleza’s clothing industry is critical to the city’s urban dynamics. Clothing manufacture is spread throughout the municipality and cities within the metropolitan region. In 1980 the production of clothing intensified in Fortaleza. The industry concentrated spatially in the peripheral regions of Fortaleza, where various types of workers reside. The industry is linked with global firms that are headquartered in other countries, as well as local firms. The industry is often located inside the residences of textile workers, who produce jeans and women’s clothing. The movement of purchasers is concentrated in various malls (*shoppings* in Portuguese) in Fortaleza, especially the Feira da Sé and the Beco da Poeira. These markets attract local purchases, in addition to people from northeastern Brazil and foreign countries, such as Cabo Verde, French Guyana and Suriname. (Text by Dr. José Borzacchiello da Silva and Marlon Cavalcante Santos, Departamento de Geografia, Universidade Federal do Ceará; translated by Christian Brannstrom).

Fortaleza clothing industry

Sale point for clothing made in Fortaleza. See entry for Beco da Poeira.

Barbara Alencar’s prison cell

José de Alencar’s family was influential in Ceará’s political development. His aunt Barbara, for example, was a leader in two early-nineteenth-century anti-monarchy independence movements, the Revolução Pernambucana (1817) and the Confederação do Equador (1824). The tiny cell in which she was imprisoned is located here, near the Mercado Central… it is a military base, but don’t be shy about gaining access because it is worth a peek.

Entrance to Mercado Central
The Mercado Central de Fortaleza, a major site for sale of artisanal work, belongs to the city of Fortaleza but is managed by Associação dos Lojistas do Mercado Central (ALMEC). The modern structure was inaugurated in 1998. The Mercado opens by day, while the Beira-Mar market opens at night.

**Pavilhão Atlântico**

The Pavilhão Atlântico is a site used by UFC geographers to hold monthly workshops on income generation through souvenirs, recycling cooking oil for homemade soap, making toys out of scrap, making chocolate sweets, etc.

**Iracema Statue**

Located at Iracema beach, the Iracema statue represents Iracema, the female protagonist in a landmark novel by José de Alencar published in 1865. Iracema has been represented in painting and sculpture numerous times. Alencar portrayed Iracema, “a virgin with lips like honey,” as the indigenous woman whose tryst with the Portuguese Martim led to the birth of a child, Moacir, representing the birth of Ceará. Moacir represents the “union” of two races and, as indicated in the subtitle of the novel “Legend of Ceará,” the origin of Ceará as fusion of indigenous and Portuguese ethnicity. There are numerous works of literary criticism on this topic, and CLAG members may see parallels to Mexico’s "La Malinche" and Latin American intellectuals who promoted the "cosmic race" idea.

The statue representing Iracema was based on a sculpture produced by the artist Zenon Barreto (1918-2002) in 1960, but according to media reports was censured by the military regime that took power in 1964, allegedly because the statue showed Iracema as a warrior holding a bow. In 1980, Barreto turned over the sculpture to another artist who converted the original into bronze. In 1996 Fortaleza’s city government inaugurated the sculpture at its present site. However, the bow was stolen a few days later. After replacement, the bow was stolen again in 2001. In 2012, after more vandalism, the bow collapsed and the city government decided to restore the pedestal and statue. Unfortunately, the site lacks a descriptive plaque.

**Ponte dos Ingleses**

This structure was built in 1921 by the English firm Norton Griffths as a bridge (hence the name "ponte") to an offshore port-island that was never built. The state government restored the structure in the 1990s; the architects Fausto Nilo and Delberg Ponce de Leon, who were involved in the Centro Dragão do Mar, handled this restoration.

**Estoril**
Estoril, today a restaurant, was constructed in the 1920s. In the 1940s, Estoril became the headquarters for the USO. Fortaleza natives recall that local women would go there to drink Coca-Cola—a novelty at the time—and became known as the "coca-colas." At the time, the building was known as "Vila Morena" but was re-named Estoril by Portuguese tenants, after a city in Portugal. The city financed the restoration of the building in 2008.

**Palácio da Abolição**

The Palácio da Abolição, present location of Ceará's executive banch, was inaugurated on 4 July 1970. The structure was designed by Sérgio Bernardes and the gardens by Burle Marx, who received geographical study by James Curtis in “Praças, place, and public life in urban Brazil” (Geographical Review 90 [2000]: 475-92). In 1986, governor Tasso Jereissati moved the executive offices to a separate building, the Palácio do Cambeba, but the executive branch returned to this site in 2010 or 2011. The term “abolição” refers to the claim that Ceará was the first Brazilian province to abolish slavery in 1884. Part of the complex contains the remains of Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco (1897-1967), the first leader of the military regime that took power on 1 April 1964 in a military coup encouraged by the U.S. government.

**Castelo Branco mausoleum**

Castelo Branco was a key protagonist in the 1 April 1964 military coup. Born in Fortaleza, Castelo Branco was related to José de Alencar’s descendents. The mausoleum is a modernist project designed by Bernardes and inaugurated in 1972. Bernardes worked with Lucio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer, key leaders in the planning and design of Brasília, in the 1940s and 1950s. The U.S. role in supporting Castelo Branco’s coup d’etat is documented in materials declassified in 2004 (http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/). In these documents (attached in PDF), U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson argues, “I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do,” in regard to preparations for the coup. Days before the coup, U.S. Ambassasdor Lincoln Gordon alleged that Brazilian President João Goulart was working with the Brazilian Communist Party to “seize dictatorial power.” Gordon urged the U.S. to support the forces of General Castello Branco, advising “a clandestine delivery of arms” and a shipment of gas and oil..

**Beira-Mar Artisan Market**

Great place for shopping for locally produced crafts, tacky Portuguese T-shirts and souvenirs. The atmosphere is terrific and there are plenty of places to eat and drink next to this open-air market. However, the market only opens in the evening. This market is located on the Beira-Mar, the site of intensive urban development of high-rise apartments and hotels. This process is analyzed by Paula et al., "High-rise development

50 Sabores ice cream

Great ice cream (several flavors from Caatinga plants), great location (Beira-Mar)...they welcome you to taste as many flavors as you wish.

Padaria Ideal

Equal parts supermarket, bakery, and café…and close to many hotels in Meireles and Iracema.

Pão de Açúcar supermarket

Traded on the NYSE (CBD), the Pão de Açúcar supermarket chain is controlled by the Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição, formerly known as Grupo Pão de Açúcar, and held by the French firm Grupo Casino. Pão de Açúcar is Brazil’s largest grocery chain, founded as a sweetshop in 1948 by Valentim Diniz (1913-2008). My favorite items are feijoada-flavored bouillon cubes (hard to find at Kroger’s) and Havaianas.

Habib’s

Habib’s is a fast-food franchise, specializing in Arabic food, such as kibe, modified for Brazilian tastes. More than 400 Habib’s franchises exist in Brazil. A Portuguese entrepreneur, Antônio Alberto Saraiva, started the chain in 1988 in São Paulo state. Look for the tacky rendition of a stereotypical Middle Eastern man on a large sign.

Lav-Lev laundromat

In case you need to wash your clothes

Banco do Brasil

This bank and several others on this busy avenue have ATMs that are compatible with debit cards issued by U.S. banks.

Hotel Diogo
Example of the type of hotel in the Meireles and Iracema districts on the northern shore of Fortaleza.

**Holiday Inn**

Example of the type of hotel in the Meireles and Iracema districts on the northern shore of Fortaleza. This hotel is on the Beira-Mar, next to the paved walkway that parallels this part of the coast.

**Hotel Mareiro**

Example of the type of hotel in the Meireles and Iracema districts on the northern shore of Fortaleza. Short walk from the nighttime artisan market

**Hotel Ibis**

Example of the type of hotel in the Meireles and Iracema districts on the northern shore of Fortaleza. Cheaper hotels may be found 2-5 blocks from the beach, compared to hotels on the Beira-Mar.

**Pousada Orlando**

Affordable, great location (near Estoril and the Dragao do Mar complex)

**Crocodile Beach**

Built on "public" coastal land in Praia do Futuro, this private development shows an interesting hybrid space in which private developers have converted public beach space into a partly paid and exclusive space (the pool, restaurants) while tolerating street vendors and other uses of "public" space. In other areas of coastal Brazil, simple "barracas," from which this site evolved, have been dismalted under judicial order. But here there is an informal agreement between business owners and the state: allow public access to the beach while carrying on with tourism development. This site, in particular, is well suited to families because of clean restrooms, showers, and a pool.

Thursdays are a particularly good time to visit this area, because it is traditionally "crab night." These sites on Praia do Futuro are a short taxi ride, approximately R$30, from the Beira-Mar hotels. Aspects of coastal land development are detailed in UFC geographer Alexandre Queiroz Pereira’s recent book, *A urbanização vai à praia* (Fortaleza, 2014).
Pici e Cocorote: as Bases Americanas no Ceará

As atividades aeronáuticas no Estado do Ceará, em especial na cidade de Fortaleza, tiveram início bem antes da Segunda Guerra Mundial. Quando a Guerra começou, precisamente no dia 1º de setembro de 1939 com a invasão alemã à Polônia, os aviões da Pan American e os do Sindicato Condor já operavam na foz do rio Ceará, fato esse abordado em capítulo anterior.

Desde 1930 que a capital cearense possuía uma base terrestre, denominada de Alto da Balança. Sua notoriedade, no entanto, só veio a acontecer com a presença em Fotaleza da aviadora Amelia Earhart, uma das expoentes da aviação norte-americana.

Com o ingresso dos Estados Unidos na guerra, após o bombardeio de Pearl Harbor no dia 7 de dezembro de 1941, as ações se desenrolaram com muita rapidez. Esse fato justificou a presença dos estadunidenses no Atlântico Sul. Alguns meses antes, cumprindo instruções do presidente dos EUA Franklin Delano Roosevelt, o general George C. Marshall(*) havia assumido vários acordos com o governo de Getúlio Vargas para a construção de bases no Norte e no Nordeste brasileiro.

A Panair, subsidiária brasileira da Pan American, através de um

(*) Vários presidentes ou secretários norte-americanos vieram das forças armadas ou estiveram ligados a ela. Vale lembrar que o maior e mais completo plano de reconstrução do mundo depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial, o Plano Marshall, foi elaborado basicamente sob uma ótica político-militar, liderada pelo general George C. Marshall, em 1947, quando era secretário de Estado Harry Truman.

O projeto do Pici previa uma pista de 5.000 pés de extensão para permitir o trânsito de aviões de porte médio, além de prestar apoio às aeronaves que faziam o patrulhamento do litoral nordestino.

O Brasil só entrou na guerra em agosto de 1942. Mesmo assim, em 11 de dezembro de 1941, a Base de Natal recebia dos EUA o Esquadrão VP-52 da Força Aeronaval Americana. O esquadrão era composto por seis aviões Catalina (PBY-5) e tinham como finalidade cumprir missões de guerra.

Segundo historiadores, a pista do Pici foi inaugurada prematuramente (com apenas 75% de extensão construída) em fevereiro de 1942, por ocasião do pouso de um avião norte-americano B-17, que se encontrava perdido de sua rota original. A permanência da aeronave em Fortaleza foi de apenas 30 minutos.
Dados da época informam que o sobrevoo da aeronave causou certo pânico na população local em função das notícias que chegavam da Europa. O temor de então era causado pela possível participação brasileira na Segunda Guerra Mundial.

A conclusão da pista do Pici data de março de 1942. Análises técnicas e meteorológicas, levantadas tanto por especialistas brasileiros como norte-americanos, preconizavam que houve precipitação no posicionamento da pista (veja mais adiante relato do agrimensor cearense Fernando de Castro Lima, sobre o assunto).

As limitadas dimensões da pista do Pici, e o avanço das forças alemãs na Europa e na África fizeram com que os norte-americanos resolvessem procurar outro local para a construção de uma nova pista em Fortaleza. A ideia era permitir pouso e decolagens de grandes aviões de bombardeio. Essa estratégia visava também a desfogar a base de Parnamirim, no Rio Grande do Norte, que já havia entrado

Comemoração entre os funcionários civis da Base da Navy (Marinha norte-americana) no Pici. Nos detalhes, ao centro, o comerciante Lúis Lage, e à esquerda o professor Mozart Solon (falecido)
em processo de saturação face ao grande número de vôos destinados para o local.

Em fevereiro de 1943 os norte-americanos começaram o levantamento topográfico de uma nova área para a construção da futura base na capital cearense. O local escolhido por eles compreende hoje a parte mais nobre da Aldeota, bairro chique e mais valorizado da cidade. O lugar pretendido era o espaço entre as avenidas Desembargador Moreira, Santos-Dumont e Dom Luís, além de parte da Praia de Iracema, e toda a praça da Bandeira, defronte ao Colégio Militar, incluindo as ruas adjacentes.

O projeto previa a abertura de duas pistas em forma de V, com o vértice situado na avenida Desembargador Moreira, exatamente onde hoje está o Círculo Militar de Fortaleza. Os prolongamentos da pista eram direcionados, um para a Praia de Iracema e o outro na direção da atual igreja do Cristo Rei, na praça da Bandeira, em frente ao Colégio Militar.

Horace Wilson Bennett, norte-americano que comandava o pessoal civil na Base do Pici.
Aeronaves norte-americanas estacionadas na Base do Pici, provavelmente prontas para serem acionadas. Essa foto foi fornecida pelo Departamento de Defesa dos USA.

Blimp K-84 (foto) era um dirigível pertencente à Marinha americana da Base do Pici. Tinha como função patrulhar o Oceano Atlântico, a partir de Fortaleza, à procura de submarinos alemães. Comenta-se que, em algumas oportunidades, o Blimp mudava de rota e movia-se vagarosamente sobre prédios e residências no Bairro do Benfica. Segundo alguns relatos chegam aos autores deste livro, era comum o dirigível ser visto pairando próximo a uma edificação situada na avenida da Universidade, nº 2486, na esquina com a Rua Senador Catunda. Segundo consta, os norte-americanos gostavam de aos hospitais a vida azul. Informações dão conta de que eles não perdem a oportunidade de apreciar dois, uma jovem ali residente que gostava de tomar sol diariamente em traje de banho, deitada sobre a laje de cobertura da caixa d'água do prédio. No local dessa residência, hoje funciona a diretoria da Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Atuária e Contabilidade (Feac) da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC).
Na década de 60, a pista do Pici serviu de local para corridas de carros. É atribuído ao empresário e piloto José Antunes Queiroz a ideia de utilizar a pista como local de disputa automobilística. Nessa época, toda a área do Pici pertencia à Panair do Brasil que, após decretação da sua falência, o espaço passou a jurisdição de várias instituições federais.

A foto mostra o tanque que era utilizado para lavagem do ‘casto de comando’ do dirigível Blimp K-84, da Marinha americana. O registro é recente, feito em frente a um dos prédios da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC), no Bairro do Pici.
For your personal information only, the following decisions have been taken in order to be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Coulart forces if it is decided this should be done.

1. Dispatch of US Navy tankers bearing POL from Aruba, first tanker expected off Santos between April 8 and 13; following three tankers at one day intervals.

2. Immediate dispatch of naval task force for overt exercises off Brazil. Force to consist of aircraft carrier (expected arrive in area by April 10), four destroyers, two destroyer escorts, task force tankers (all expected arrive about four days later).

3. Assemble shipment of about 110 tons ammunition, other light equipment including tear gas for mob control for air lift to Sao Paolo (Campinas). Lift would be made within 24 to 36 hours upon issuance final orders and would involve 10 cargo planes.
6 tankers, and 6 fighters

Unloading of POL by US Navy tankers (item 1) and dispatch of airlift (item 3) would require further development politico-military situation to point where some group having reasonable claim to legitimacy could formally request recognition and aid from us and if possible from other American Republics. Dispatch of tankers from Aruba and of naval task force does not immediately as involve us in Brazilian situation and is regarded by us/normal naval exercise.
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

SECRET

ACTION: Amembasy RIO DE JANEIRO 1305 FLASH
Info: DEFENSE FOR McNAMARA AND TAYLOR
GIA FOR Mccone

NODIS FOR AMBASSADOR GORDON

Following corrections should be made in Deptel 1301:

1) XXX Para one should read: "Dispatch of U.S. Navy tankers bearing POL from Aruba, first tanker expected off Santos April 13; following three tankers at one day intervals."

2) Second sentence in para two should read: "Force to consist of aircraft carrier and two guided missile destroyers (expected to arrive in area by April 10), four destroyers task force tankers (all expected to arrive about four days later)."

3) Strike words "tear gas" in first sentence of para three, and insert "CS agent".

4) Reference to "10 cargo planes" in second sentence of para three should be "six cargo planes".

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-286
By: [Signatory] NARA, Date: 3-24-64

END

Rusk

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ARA - Mr. Adams
Personal from Ambassador Gordon. Please pass immediately to Secretary of State Rusk, Assistant Secretary Mann, Ralph Burton, Secretary Defense McNamara, Assistant Secretary Defense McNaughton, General Maxwell Taylor, CIA Director John Mcöne, Colonel J. C. King, Desmond Fitzgerald, White House for Bundy and Dungan, pass to Canal Zone for General O Meara. Other distribution only by approval above named.

1. Since my message on Friday, effects of Navy crisis have substantially worsened the overall situation and possibly shortened the time factors. The replacement of Navy Minister Silvio Mota by a super-annuated left-wing Admiral, Paulo Mario Cunha Rodrigues, reliably reported to have been proposed by Communist leaders and the CGT, the retention of Aragão as Marine Commandant, and the total amnesty for the rebellious sailors and Marines, are all body blows to the morale of the officer corps of all three services and are apparently frightening many congressmen. (We expect more light on latter point from Brasilia Monday). The worst feature of the episode is that the tactical moves by the palace Friday afternoon were directed hour by hour by a close-knit group composed mainly of Communists. Left-wing group now talking openly about new advances beginning with "cleaning out the Army". Resistance forces, both military and civilian, seeking recover from unexpected setback and consulting feverishly on future courses of action.

2. Re para 2 of reference, will transmit bill of goods as soon as available. I have had no direct contact with military plotters. My definite judgement is that ARMA must continue intelligence contacts for which he uniquely qualified, but that any operational contacts will become responsibility of 3.3

3. Re para 3 of Saturday's message purpose of unidentified arms made available soonest and if possible pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence could be manifold, depending on unforeseeable development of events. Could be used by Para-military units working with Democratic Military groups, or by friendly military against hostile military if necessary. Immediate effect, which we stress, would be Holster will to resist and facilitate initial success. Given Brazilian predilection joining victorious causes, initial success could be key to side on which many indecisive forces would land and therefore key to prompt victory with minimal violence. Risk of later attribution to us Government covert operation seems minor to us in relation positive effects if operation conducted with skill, bearing in mind that many things we don't do are being regularly so attributed.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13222, Sec 3.5
NLJ 05-286
By NARA, Date 2-24-04

COPY LBJ LIBRARY
4. Re paragraph 4 of Saturday's message, my purpose in paragraphs 14 and 18 of Friday's message was to make clear that in civil war type situation our ability to show force promptly in response appeal from politically recognized democratic side might be crucial determining factor in early victory that side. I well understand how grave a decision is implied in this contingency commitment to overt military intervention here. But we must also weigh seriously the possible alternative, which I am not predicting but can envisage as real danger of defeat of democratic resistance and communication of Brasil. We did not intend naval operation to be covert, and overt maneuvers in South Atlantic could be healthy influence.

5. Re para 5 of Saturday's message recent Arma reports cover much of this ground. We will continue studying and reporting regularly on these questions, especially possibility and consequences initiative of group of governors without prior Congressional coverage.

6. Re para 6 of Saturday's message, I see no present point in foot-dragging on debt negotiations or hold action on AID loans, unless preceded by some clear indication of United States government concern with basic problem of Brasilians political regime. No one expects action on debts until a month hence anyway. In case of AID projects of direct interest to clearly democratic elements, such as Cemar, we believe approvals and announcements should continue. We shall evaluate each case as it arises in light of political effects at the time. If we later reach point of wanting to suspend aid publicly, which would be especially dramatic if wheat included, more appropriate time would be in response more obvious political developments than have yet occurred and which would probably include direct attacks on our economic interests. On this subject I await eagerly your April 1 advice on coffee penalties.

7. What is needed now is a sufficiently clear indication of United States government concern to reassure the large numbers of democrats in Brazil that we are not indifferent to the danger of a Communist revolution here, but couched in terms that cannot be openly rejected by Goulart as undue intervention. I am cancelling my trip programmed to Alagoas and Bahia Monday through Wednesday, sending Kubish to represent me, and this cancellation will convey some measure of concern. Our discreet,
informal contacts with friendly Brazilians also help. Nothing that we here can do, however, will be nearly as influential as a high-level Washington statement. Press reports at home on the navy crisis surely could serve as a peg for such statement.

8. I therefore reiterate recommendation in para 17 of Friday's message. In light developments described para 1 this message, earliest possible action would achieve optimum results.
PERSONAL FROM AMBASSADOR GORDON. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO
SEC. STATE RUSK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MANN, RALPH BURTON, SEC.
DEFENSE McNAMARA, ASSISTANT SEC. DEFENSE McNUGHTON, GENERAL
MAXWELL TAYLOR, CIA DIRECTOR JOHN MCCONE, COL. J. C. KING,
DESIGNATE FITZGERALD, WHITE HOUSE FOR BUNY AND DUNGAN, PASS TO
CANAL ZONE FOR GENERAL O'MEARA. OTHER DISTRIBUTION ONLY BY
APPROVAL ABOVE NAMED.

1. SINCE RETURNING TO RIO 22 MARCH I HAVE CANVASED BRAZILIAN
SITUATION THOROUGHLY WITH KEY CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STAFF MEMBERS
HERE, CONVINCING SAO PAULO AND BRASILIA POST CHIEFS TO ASSIST
AND ALSO MAKING SELECTED CONTACT WITH SOME WELL INFORMED
BRAZILIANS.

2. MY CONSIDERED CONCLUSION IS THAT GOULART IS NOW DEFINITELY
ENGAGED ON CAMPAIGN TO SEIZE DICTATORIAL POWER, ACCEPTING THE
ACTIVE COLLABORATION OF THE BRAZILIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, AND OF
OTHER RADICAL LEFT REVOLUTIONARIES TO THIS END. IF WE WERE TO
SUCCEED IT IS MORE THAN LIKELY THAT BRAZIL WOULD COME UNDER
FULL COMMUNIST CONTROL, EVEN THOUGH GOULART MIGHT HOPE TO TURN
AGAINST HIS COMMUNIST SUPPORTERS ON THE PERONIST MODEL WHICH
I BELIEVE HE PERSONALLY PREFERENCES.

3. THE IMMEDIATE TACTICS OF THE GOULART PALACE GUARD ARE
CONCENTRATED ON PRESSURES TO SECURE FROM THE CONGRESS
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS UNATTAINABLE BY NORMAL MEANS, USING A
COMBINATION OF URBAN STREET DEMONSTRATIONS, THREATENED OR ACTUAL
STRIKES, SPORADIC RURAL VIOLENCE, AND ABUSE OF THE ENORMOUS
DISCRETIONARY FINANCIAL POWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. THIS
IS BEING COUPLED WITH A SERIES OF POPULIST EXECUTIVE DECREES
OF DUBIOUS LEGALITY AND AN INSPIRED RUMOR CAMPAIGN OF OTHER
DECREES CALCULATED TO FRIGHTEN RESISTANCE ELEMENTS. ESPECIALLY
IMPORTANT IN THIS CONNECTION IS THE ABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
TO WEAKEN RESISTANCE AT THE STATE LEVEL BY WITHHOLDING ESSENTIAL

[Signature]
I must calculate to frighten resistance elements. Especially important in this connection is the ability of the President to weaken resistance at the state level by withholding essential federal financing. The government is also subjecting radio and TV outlets to a partial censorship, increasing the use of the national news agency and requisitioning broadcast time for its reformist propaganda, and making thinly veiled threats against the opposition press. The purpose is not in fact to secure constructive social and economic reforms, but to discredit the existing constitution and the Congress, laying a foundation for a coup from the top down which might then be ratified by a rigged plebiscite and the rewriting of the constitution by a rigged constituent assembly.

4. I do not wholly discard the hypothesis of Goulart's being frightened off this campaign and serving out his normal term (until January 31, 1966) with proper presidential elections being held in October, 1965. This would still be the best outcome for Brazil and for the United States if it can happen. Goulart's commitments to the revolutionary left are now so far-reaching, however, that the chances of achieving this peaceful outcome through constitutional normalcy seem a good deal less than 50-50. He may make tactical retreats to tranquilize the opposition again, as he has in the past. There are some signs that this has happened in the past few days, as a result of the 19 March massive opposition street rally in São Paulo, the declared hostility of the governors of several major states, and warnings and rumblings within the officer corps, especially of the army. But past experience shows that each tactical retreat leaves considerable ground gained and the next advance goes further than the previous one. With his time running out and the candidates for the succession getting actively into the field, Goulart is under pressure to act faster and with less calculation of the risks. His government is also accelerating the rate of inflation to a
GETTING ACTIVELY INTO THE FIELD, GOULART IS UNDER PRESSURE TO ACT FASTER AND WITH LESS CALCULATION OF THE RISKS. HIS GOVERNMENT IS ALSO ACCELERATING THE RATE OF INFLATION TO A POINT THREATENING ECONOMIC BREAKDOWN AND SOCIAL DISORDER. A DESPERATE LUNGE FOR TOTALITARIAN POWER MIGHT BE MADE AT ANY TIME.

TOP SECRET

CFN 3924 AMBASSADOR GORDON SEC STATE RUSK MANN RALPH BURTON
SEC DEFENSE MC NAMARA SEC DEFENSE MC NAUGHTON GENERZL MAXWELL TAYLOR CIA JOHN NO CONE COL J C KING DESMOND FITZGERALD BUNDY DUNGAN CANAL ZONE GENERAL O'HEARA RIO 22 MARCH BRAZILIAN CONVOKING SAO PAULO BRASILIA BRAZILIANS GOULART, DICTATORIAL BRAZILIAN COMMUNIST BRAZIL COMMUNIST GOULART COMMUNIST I GOULART CONGRESS A URBAN SPORADIC A POPULIST TV A REFORMIST PROPAGANDA NOT IN A A COUP TOP DOWN A PLEBISCITE A CONSTITUENT I NOT WHOLLY HYPOTHESIS GOULARTS JANUARY 31 1966 OCTOBER 1965 BRAZIL UNITED STATES GOULARTS A 50-50 TRANQUILIZE A 19 MARCH SAO PAULO GOULART A A

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AND PREPARE PERSONNEL WITH SIGNIFICANT RESULTS ESPECIALLY THROUGH SUPPORTIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND THEIR SUPPORTING PERSONNEL. THE LIT PERSUASION TO MAINTAIN THE ARMED FORCES AND PREPARE A MODERN MILITARY FOR LONG-STANDING RIGHT-WING RATIONALIZATION AND TRANSMIT THE ORGANIZATIONAL NATURE TO THE LEADERS AND DICTORS THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT.

IN THE ARMED FORCES THERE ARE A NUMBER OF NON-LISTED OFFICERS, EDUCATION, AND EMPLOYMENT IN MANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

PRESIDENCY, IMPORTANT UNITS OF THE MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE AND MINISTRIES, THE MILITARY AND CIVIL HOUSES OF THE NATION FORM IN MANY NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND SOME OTHER NIT LEADERSHIP IN MILITARY, INDUSTRIAL, AND COMMERCIAL SHIPBOARD.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF POSTS AND ITS ENSUING THE TRADE UNION REMAINING PRIMITIVE OR RELATIVELY NOT UNDER ITS CONTROL.

UNDER THE DICTATE OF WHICH IS NO TAKING OVER THE PACE OF MANY STRATEGIC POINTS, HOUSES, INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMS, WHICH THE PEOPLE OF THE CONGRESS, IT WAS SKEPTICALLY, TAKEN CONTROL REPRESENTS A SMALL HUMANITY NOT MORE THAN 12 TO 20 PERCENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS COMMUNIST AFFILIATES.

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6. I undertook in March 21 talk with Secretary Rusk to appraise the strength and spirit of the resistance forces and the circumstances that might trigger internal violence and showdown. I find that since the Goulart-Syndicalist street rally in Rio on March 13 there has been a radical polarization of attitudes, political and public leadership in crystallizing overt support for the Constitution and Congress, for reforms only within the Constitution, and for rejection of communists, has come from a group of governors: Lacerda of Guanabara, Adhemar de Barros of Sao Paulo, Menezes of Rio Grande do Sul, Braga of Parana, and (somewhat to my surprise) Nagalhaes Pinto of Minas Gerais. They have been fortified by the clear declaration of Ex-President Marshal Dutra and the nomination acceptance speech of Kubitschek. The huge pro-democratic rally in Sao Paulo March 19, largely organized by women's groups, has provided an important element of mass popular showing, which reacts favorably in turn on Congress and the armed forces.

7. There is a reciprocal interdependence of action between Congress and the armed forces. Congressional resistance to illegal executive actions and to unwarranted presidential demands for constitutional change depends on the conviction that the members will have military coverage if they take a stand. The legalist tradition of the armed forces is so strong that they would desire, if at all possible, congressional coverage for any action against Goulart. The action of Congress is therefore one major key to the situation.

8. While a clear majority of Congress mistrusts Goulart's purposes and scorns his evident incompetence, the present consensus of anti-Goulart congressional leaders is that an absolute majority of the lower house cannot now be mustered for impeachment. They also oppose a move of Congress away from Brasilia as tending to undercut their already tarnished prestige, although they would keep open a dramatic retreat to somewhere as a last resort in a near civil war.
SÃO PAULO OR ELSEWHERE AS A LAST RESORT IN A NEAR CIVIL WAR OR OPEN CIVIL WAR SITUATION. THEY ARE PRESENTLY FOCUSSING ON THE APPROVAL OF SOME MILD REFORM MEASURES AS ONE WAY OF COUNTERING GOULART'S ANTI-CONGRESS CAMPAIGN, AND CONSIDERING OTHER MORE AFFIRMATIVE MEANS OF SHOWING RESISTANCE. THEY ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO VOTE A PLEBISCITE LAW, A DELEGATION OF POWERS, LEGALIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, VOTES FOR ILLITERATES, OR OTHER POLITICAL CHANGES Sought By GOULART.

9. BY ALL ODDS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IS THE CRYSTALLIZING OF A MILITARY RESISTANCE GROUP UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF GEN. HUMBERTO CASTELLO BRANCO, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. CASTELLO BRANCO IS A HIGHLY COMPÉTENT, DISCREET, HONEST, AND DEEPLY RESPECTED OFFICER WHO HAS STRONG LOYALTY TO LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND UNILY RECENTLY SHUNNED ANY APPROACHES FROM ANTI-GOULART CONSPIRATORS. HE HAS ASSOCIATED WITH HIM A GROUP OF OTHER WELL-PLACED SENIOR OFFICERS AND IS NOW ASSUMING CONTROL AND SYSTEMATIC DIRECTION OF THE WIDESPREAD BUT HITHERTO LOOSELY ORGANIZED RESISTANCE GROUPS, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, IN ALL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY.

SECRET

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10. Castello Branco's preference would be to act only in case of obvious unconstitutional provocation, e.g., a Soulartist move to close Congress or to intervene in one of the opposition states (Guanabara or Sao Paulo being the most likely ones). He recognizes, however (as do I) that Soulart may avoid such obvious provocation, while continuing to move toward an irreversible fait accompli by means of manipulated strikes, financial undermining of the states, and an executive plebiscite—including voting by illiterates—to back up a Bonapartist or Gauthier-type assumption of power. Castello Branco is therefore preparing for a possible move sparked by a Communist-led general strike call, another sergeants' rebellion, a plebiscite call opposed by Congress, or even a major governmental countermove against the democratic military or civilian leadership. In these cases, political coverage might have to come in the first instance from a grouping of state governors declaring themselves the legitimate government of Brazil, with congressional endorsement following (if Congress were still able to act). It is also possible that Soulart might resign under pressure from solid military opposition, either to flee the country or to lead a "populist" revolutionary movement. The possibilities clearly include civil war, with some horizontal or vertical division within the armed forces, aggravated by the widespread possession of arms incivilian hands on both sides.

11. Unlike the many previous anti-Soulart coup groups who have approached us during the past two and one-half years,
11. Unlike the many previous anti-Goulart coup groups who have approached us during the past two and one half years, the Castello Branco movement shows prospects of widespread support and competent leadership. If our influence is to be brought to bear to help avert a major disaster here — which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s — this is where both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed.

(Secretary Rusk and Mann should note that Alberto Byington is working with this group.) We hold this view even should Castello Branco be relieved as Army Chief of Staff.

12. Despite their strength in the officer corps, the resistance group is concerned about the adequacy of arms and the possible sabotage of fuel supplies. Within the coming week, we will be apprised of their estimates of needed arms through contact between Arma and Gen. Cinfra, right-hand man of Castello Branco. Fuel needs would include the navy fuel now being sought by Byington together with motor fuel and aviation gasoline.

13. Given the absolute uncertainty of timing of a possible trigger incident (which could occur tomorrow or any other day); we recommend:

(a) That measures be taken soonest to prepare for a clandestine delivery of arms of non-US origin, to be made available to Castello Branco supporters in Sao Paulo as soon as requirements known and arrangements can be worked out. Best delivery means now apparent to us is unmarked submarine to be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in State of Sao Paulo south of Santos, probably near Iguape or Ganaeia.

(b) This should be accompanied by fuel availabilities (bulk, packaged, or both may be required), also avoiding USG identification, with deliveries to await outbreak active hostilities. Action on this (DepTel 1281) should proceed forthwith.

TOP SECRET

CFN CASTELLO BRANCOS E G A GOULARTIST GUANABAIRA SAO PAULO
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14. THE ABOVE TWO ACTIONS MIGHT SUFFICE TO SECURE VICTORY FOR FRIENDLY FORCES WITHOUT ANY OVERT US LOGISTICAL OR MILITARY PARTICIPATION, ESPECIALLY IF POLITICALLY COVERED BY PROMPT US RECOGNITION OUR SIDE AS LEGITIMATE GOV. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, ALSO PREPARE WITHOUT DELAY AGAINST THE CONTINGENCY OF NEEDED OVERT INTERVENTION AT A SECOND STAGE AND ALSO AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET ACTION TO SUPPORT THE COMMUNIST-LEANING SIDE, TO MINIMIZE POSSIBILITIES OF A PROLONGED CIVIL WAR AND SECURE THE ADHERENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF BAND-WAGON JUMPERS. OUR ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT AND SOME SHOW OF FORCE WITH GREAT SPEED COULD BE CRUCIAL. FOR THIS PURPOSE AND IN KEEPING WITH OUT WASHINGTON TALKS MARCH 21, ONE POSSIBILITY APPEARS TO BE THE EARLY DETACHMENT OF A NAVAL TASK FORCE FOR MANEUVERS IN SOUTH ATLANTIC, BRINGING THEM WITHIN A FEW DAYS' STEAMING DISTANCE OF SANTOS. LOGISTICAL SUPPLIES SHOULD MEET REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN CINC SOUTH BRAZIL CONTINGENCY PLAN (USCOTFP-BRAZIL) REVIEWED HERE MARCH 9. CARRIER AIRCRAFT WOULD BE MOST IMPORTANT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT. MARINE CONTINGENT COULD PERFORM LOGISTICAL SECURITY TASKS SET FORTH CINC SOUTH PLAN. WE WOULD WELCOME ADVICE SOONEST ON THIS OR ALTERNATIVE METHODS MEETING OBJECTIVE DESCRIBED ABOVE.

15. WE RECOGNIZE PROBLEM UNCERTAIN DURATION OF NEED THESE FORCES IN AREA, WITH NEAR-DAILY CRises OF VARYING INTENSITY HERE; HOWEVER, AND VIOLENCE READY TO BECOME EPIDEMIC
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16. WE ARE MEANWHILE UNDERTAKING COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES WITH OUR AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO HELP STRENGTHEN RESISTANCE FORCES. THESE INCLUDE COVERT SUPPORT FOR PRO-DEMOCRACY STREET RALLIES (NEXT BIG ONE BEING APRIL 2, HERE IN RIO, AND OTHERS BEING PROGRAMMED), DISCREET PASSAGE OF WORD THAT USG DEEPLY CONCERNED AT EVENTS; AND ENCOURAGEMENT DEMOCRATIC AND ANTI-COMMUNIST SENTIMENT IN CONGRESS, ARMED FORCES, FRIENDLY LABOR AND STUDENT GROUPS, CHURCH, AND BUSINESS. WE MAY BE REQUESTING ADDITIONAL SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDS FOR OTHER COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS IN NEAR FUTURE.

17. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL, WITHOUT ENTERING INTO DETAIL, FOR SEC. STATE OR PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE RESPONSE TO INDICATE CONCERN AT REPORTS OF ECONOMIC DETERIORATION AND POLITICAL RESTLESSNESS IN BRAZIL AND IMPORTANCE TO FUTURE OF HEMISPHERE. THAT BRAZIL TRUE IS ITS DEEP-ROOTED DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS, WILL CONTINUE ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS UNDER REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY. WE RECOMMEND SUCH STATEMENT IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

PRESERVATION COPY
THIS MESSAGE IS NOT AN ALARMIST OR PANICKY REACTION TO ANY ONE EPISODE. IT REFLECTS THE JOINT CONCLUSIONS OF THE STAFF EMBASSY-LEVEL BASED ON A LONG CHAIN OF ACTIONS AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH CONVINCE US THAT THERE IS A REAL AND PRESENT DANGER TO DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM IN BRAZIL WHICH COULD CARRY THIS ENORMOUS NATION INTO THE COMMUNIST CAMP. IF THIS WERE A COUNTRY OF LESS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S., BOTH DIRECTLY AND IN ITS IMPACT ON ALL LATIN AMERICA--WE MIGHT SUGGEST A FURTHER PERIOD OF WATCHFUL WAITING: IN THE HOPE THAT BRAZILIAN RESISTANCE UNAIDED WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE PROBLEM. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD THAT IT MAY DO.


TOP SECRET

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